Thomas Nagel tries to defend moral luck by saying that a moral agent is never responsible for the action performed by him, because the situation or outer conditions of an action, which are not controlled by the agent, are responsible for an action. In this paper Ii is sought to make a solution to the moral luck problem based on a fair opportunity account of control. Thomas Nagel claims that moral luck reveals a paradox. It holds that the apparent paradox emerges only because he assumes that attributions of responsibility require agents to have total control over their actions. The reason is that a more modest understanding of what it takes for someone to be a responsible agent i.e. being capable of doing the right thing for the right reasons—dissolves the paradox and shows that responsibility and luck aren’t at odds. It is clear that moral luck leads us to the moral agent has no freedom of will and he acts something as machine. If it is held then the judicial system of all countries are to be stopped and it does not need any administrative system also. In the same way none can admire any one for his good action and condemn any one for his bad action. This is really a ridiculous. Moreover, Nagel emphasized condition of an action; but here it can be thought that a condition may have other prior conditions and these second types of condition may have third types. Thus it creates an infinitive regress; people will not be able to have the actual one.
| Published in | International Journal of Philosophy (Volume 10, Issue 1) |
| DOI | 10.11648/j.ijp.20221001.16 |
| Page(s) | 29-32 |
| Creative Commons |
This is an Open Access article, distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, provided the original work is properly cited. |
| Copyright |
Copyright © The Author(s), 2024. Published by Science Publishing Group |
Moral Agent, Responsibility, Metaphysics, Reason, Opportunity
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| [5] | PEREBOOM, D. Living Without Free Will, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2001. |
| [6] | RICHARDS, N. ‘Luck and Desert,’ Mind, 95, pp. 198–209, 1986. |
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| [12] | HEINZELMANN, R. J. “Comprehension and Moral Luck”, The Monist, (251-264), 2021. |
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APA Style
Bijay Kumar Sarkar. (2022). A Critical Analysis of Thomas Nagel’s View on Moral Luck. International Journal of Philosophy, 10(1), 29-32. https://doi.org/10.11648/j.ijp.20221001.16
ACS Style
Bijay Kumar Sarkar. A Critical Analysis of Thomas Nagel’s View on Moral Luck. Int. J. Philos. 2022, 10(1), 29-32. doi: 10.11648/j.ijp.20221001.16
AMA Style
Bijay Kumar Sarkar. A Critical Analysis of Thomas Nagel’s View on Moral Luck. Int J Philos. 2022;10(1):29-32. doi: 10.11648/j.ijp.20221001.16
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Download@article{10.11648/j.ijp.20221001.16,
author = {Bijay Kumar Sarkar},
title = {A Critical Analysis of Thomas Nagel’s View on Moral Luck},
journal = {International Journal of Philosophy},
volume = {10},
number = {1},
pages = {29-32},
doi = {10.11648/j.ijp.20221001.16},
url = {https://doi.org/10.11648/j.ijp.20221001.16},
eprint = {https://article.sciencepublishinggroup.com/pdf/10.11648.j.ijp.20221001.16},
abstract = {Thomas Nagel tries to defend moral luck by saying that a moral agent is never responsible for the action performed by him, because the situation or outer conditions of an action, which are not controlled by the agent, are responsible for an action. In this paper Ii is sought to make a solution to the moral luck problem based on a fair opportunity account of control. Thomas Nagel claims that moral luck reveals a paradox. It holds that the apparent paradox emerges only because he assumes that attributions of responsibility require agents to have total control over their actions. The reason is that a more modest understanding of what it takes for someone to be a responsible agent i.e. being capable of doing the right thing for the right reasons—dissolves the paradox and shows that responsibility and luck aren’t at odds. It is clear that moral luck leads us to the moral agent has no freedom of will and he acts something as machine. If it is held then the judicial system of all countries are to be stopped and it does not need any administrative system also. In the same way none can admire any one for his good action and condemn any one for his bad action. This is really a ridiculous. Moreover, Nagel emphasized condition of an action; but here it can be thought that a condition may have other prior conditions and these second types of condition may have third types. Thus it creates an infinitive regress; people will not be able to have the actual one.},
year = {2022}
}
TY - JOUR T1 - A Critical Analysis of Thomas Nagel’s View on Moral Luck AU - Bijay Kumar Sarkar Y1 - 2022/03/18 PY - 2022 N1 - https://doi.org/10.11648/j.ijp.20221001.16 DO - 10.11648/j.ijp.20221001.16 T2 - International Journal of Philosophy JF - International Journal of Philosophy JO - International Journal of Philosophy SP - 29 EP - 32 PB - Science Publishing Group SN - 2330-7455 UR - https://doi.org/10.11648/j.ijp.20221001.16 AB - Thomas Nagel tries to defend moral luck by saying that a moral agent is never responsible for the action performed by him, because the situation or outer conditions of an action, which are not controlled by the agent, are responsible for an action. In this paper Ii is sought to make a solution to the moral luck problem based on a fair opportunity account of control. Thomas Nagel claims that moral luck reveals a paradox. It holds that the apparent paradox emerges only because he assumes that attributions of responsibility require agents to have total control over their actions. The reason is that a more modest understanding of what it takes for someone to be a responsible agent i.e. being capable of doing the right thing for the right reasons—dissolves the paradox and shows that responsibility and luck aren’t at odds. It is clear that moral luck leads us to the moral agent has no freedom of will and he acts something as machine. If it is held then the judicial system of all countries are to be stopped and it does not need any administrative system also. In the same way none can admire any one for his good action and condemn any one for his bad action. This is really a ridiculous. Moreover, Nagel emphasized condition of an action; but here it can be thought that a condition may have other prior conditions and these second types of condition may have third types. Thus it creates an infinitive regress; people will not be able to have the actual one. VL - 10 IS - 1 ER -
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