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A Study of the Advaita Vedāntic Critique of Anyathākhyātivāda

Received: 29 January 2021    Accepted: 26 February 2021    Published: 10 March 2021
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Abstract

We usually discuss the question of determining the logical meaning of error and that of finding out the psychological conditions under which error is made possible. It is important to consider the general implications of those judgments regarding the ontological status of an illusory object. Unlike their Western counterpart, the investigation of an erroneous cognition has drawn the special attention of ancient philosophers of India. As a result, in Indian philosophy there are different theories of error which are propounded by different philosophers in accordance with the ontological schemes of their schools of philosophy. This paper is an attempt to critically discuss the Naiyāyikas’ view of error called Anyathākhyātivāda with special attention to the Advaita Vedāntic critique of it. It is interesting to analyze different new arguments that have been developed by the later philosophers of these schools. The investigation of an erroneous cognition by the philosophers of Advaita Vedānta has been continuing from Śākarācarya to the modern Indian philosophers who refute the Nyāya position with new arguments. In what follows we propose to discuss critically some of these arguments.

Published in International Journal of Philosophy (Volume 9, Issue 1)
DOI 10.11648/j.ijp.20210901.15
Page(s) 60-65
Creative Commons

This is an Open Access article, distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, provided the original work is properly cited.

Copyright

Copyright © The Author(s), 2024. Published by Science Publishing Group

Keywords

Single Complex Unitary Cognition, Extra-ordinary Perception, Ordinary Perception, Locus

References
[1] Dhirendra Mohan Datta: The Six Ways of Knowing, George Allen & Unwin Ltd., London, 1932, p. 20.
[2] Anil Kumar Ray Chaudhuri: Self and Falsity in Advaita Vedānta, Progressive Publishers, 37, College Street, Calcutta, 1955, pp. 118-119.
[3] Karl Potter: Presuppositions of India’s Philosophies, Prentice-Hall International, INC, London, 1963, p. 221.
[4] Śrī Śańkarācārya: Aparokṣānubhūti, Eng. Trans. Swāmī Vimuktānanda, Advaita Ashrama, 5, Delhi Entally Road, Kolkata, 2020, p. 57.
[5] Uddyotkara: Nyāya-Vārttika, Bibliotheca Indica, Calcutta, 1907, p. 26.
[6] Susil Kumar Maitra: Fundamental Questions of Indian Metaphysics and Logic, First Edition, Published by the author, 48G, Anath Nath Dev Lane, University of Calcutta, Calcutta, 1956, p. 130.
[7] Satischandra Chatterjee: The Nyāya Theory of Knowledge, University of Calcutta, Calcutta, 1950, p. 65.
[8] Arindam Chakrabarti: Mananera Madhu, (in Bengali), Gāṅacila, First Edition, 2008, pp. 217-234.
[9] Nani Lal Sen: A Critique of The Theories of Viparyaya, Rabindra Bharati University, Calcutta, 1965, p. i.
[10] Ashutosh Bhattacharyya Shastri: Vedānta Darshan Advaitavāda, (in Bengali), Vol. 2, University of Calcutta, Calcutta, 1949, pp. 422-425.
[11] Sadānanda Yogīndra: Vedāntasāra, Bengali Trans. Loknath Chakraborty, West Bengal State Book Board, 2011, p. 275.
[12] Anil Kumar Ray Chaudhuri: The Doctrine of Māyā, Dasgupta & Co., Calcutta, 1950, pp. 26-28.
[13] Dharmarājāadhvarīndra: Vedānta-Paribhāṣā, Eng. Trans. Swāmī Mādhavānanda, Advaita Ashrama, 5, Delhi Entally Road, Kolkata, 2019, pp. 39-41.
[14] Chandradaya Bhattacharyya: Advaita Vedānte Ajñāna, (in Bengali), Sanskrit College, 1, Bankim Chatterjee Street, Calcutta, 1994, pp. 6-10.
[15] Mridula Bhattacharyya: Khyātivāder Digdarśan, (in Bengali), First Edition, Maha Bodhi Book Agency, College Square, Kolkata, 2015, pp. 21-27.
[16] Jayanta Bhaṭṭa: Nyāya Mañjarī, Vizianagaram Sanskrit Series, Benaras, 1895, (Ed.) Suryanarayan Sukla, Chowkhamba, Benaras, 1936, p. 36.
[17] Bijayananda Kar: The Theories of Error in Indian Philosophy, Ajanta Publication, Delhi, 1978, p. 63.
[18] Rupa Bandyopadhyay: Indian Theories of Illusion, First Edition, Maha Bodhi Book Agency, College Square, Kolkata, 2020, p. 1.
[19] Rasvihary Das: Kanter Darshan, (in Bengali), Fifth Edition, West Bengal State Book Board, 2011, p. 37.
[20] Stephen H. Phillips and N. S. Rāmānuja Tattvacharya: “From Gangeśa’s Tattvacintāmaṇi: Discourse on Perceptual Presentation of Something as Other than What It Is Anyathā-khyāti-vāda”, Journal of Indian Philosophy, Vol. 28, 2000 pp. 567-650.
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    Trisha Paul. (2021). A Study of the Advaita Vedāntic Critique of Anyathākhyātivāda. International Journal of Philosophy, 9(1), 60-65. https://doi.org/10.11648/j.ijp.20210901.15

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    Trisha Paul. A Study of the Advaita Vedāntic Critique of Anyathākhyātivāda. Int. J. Philos. 2021, 9(1), 60-65. doi: 10.11648/j.ijp.20210901.15

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    AMA Style

    Trisha Paul. A Study of the Advaita Vedāntic Critique of Anyathākhyātivāda. Int J Philos. 2021;9(1):60-65. doi: 10.11648/j.ijp.20210901.15

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  • @article{10.11648/j.ijp.20210901.15,
      author = {Trisha Paul},
      title = {A Study of the Advaita Vedāntic Critique of Anyathākhyātivāda},
      journal = {International Journal of Philosophy},
      volume = {9},
      number = {1},
      pages = {60-65},
      doi = {10.11648/j.ijp.20210901.15},
      url = {https://doi.org/10.11648/j.ijp.20210901.15},
      eprint = {https://article.sciencepublishinggroup.com/pdf/10.11648.j.ijp.20210901.15},
      abstract = {We usually discuss the question of determining the logical meaning of error and that of finding out the psychological conditions under which error is made possible. It is important to consider the general implications of those judgments regarding the ontological status of an illusory object. Unlike their Western counterpart, the investigation of an erroneous cognition has drawn the special attention of ancient philosophers of India. As a result, in Indian philosophy there are different theories of error which are propounded by different philosophers in accordance with the ontological schemes of their schools of philosophy. This paper is an attempt to critically discuss the Naiyāyikas’ view of error called Anyathākhyātivāda with special attention to the Advaita Vedāntic critique of it. It is interesting to analyze different new arguments that have been developed by the later philosophers of these schools. The investigation of an erroneous cognition by the philosophers of Advaita Vedānta has been continuing from Śākarācarya to the modern Indian philosophers who refute the Nyāya position with new arguments. In what follows we propose to discuss critically some of these arguments.},
     year = {2021}
    }
    

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Author Information
  • Department of Philosophy, University of Calcutta, Kolkata, India

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