Volume 6, Issue 2, June 2018, Page: 32-39
The ‘Truth’ Between Realism and Anti-Realism
Samal H R. Manee, Department of Philosophy, University of Sofia, Sofia, Bulgaria
Received: May 4, 2018;       Accepted: May 30, 2018;       Published: Jun. 25, 2018
DOI: 10.11648/j.ijp.20180602.13      View  402      Downloads  35
This article examines what realists and anti-realist debates are all about. Through presenting the core of the main arguments in these debates, these are significant arguments and they are the kind of arguments that can clarify what it meant by ‘truth’ between Realist and anti-realist in general. The concluding remark is that though the main anti- realist’s arguments in these debates can be seen as some powerful arguments through raising questions on the relationship between theory and evidence, success and truth. However, the success of science and the use of science in everyday life has not been given any satisfactory explanations by the anti-realists nor the use of it has been shut out from the daily life by these arguments against it.
Science, Epistemology, Methodology, Realism & Anti-Realism, UTE, Truth, Logic, Knowledge
To cite this article
Samal H R. Manee, The ‘Truth’ Between Realism and Anti-Realism, International Journal of Philosophy. Vol. 6, No. 2, 2018, pp. 32-39. doi: 10.11648/j.ijp.20180602.13
Copyright © 2018 Authors retain the copyright of this article.
This article is an open access article distributed under the Creative Commons Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/) which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
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